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Abstract
The European Court of Justice (“the ECJ” or “the Court”) is widely recognized as one of
the world’s most successful international tribunals and has been held up as a model for others.
Its reputation is in large measure based on its contribution to the “constitutionalization” of the
European Community Treaties and to the functioning of the common market, particularly in the
1960s and 1970s. What has perhaps received less attention is the range of mechanisms employed
by the Member States since the late 1980s to contain what they regard as expansive lawmaking
by the ECJ. Those mechanisms have sometimes generated new waves of activism on the part
of the ECJ as it has sought to compensate for their perceived defects. Is this frosty dialogue
between the ECJ and the Member States conducive to the healthy development of the European
Union and its legal order? If not, what can be done to break the pattern? In Part I, I attempt to
anchor discussion of these issues in some of the academic literature on the post-war proliferation
of international courts and tribunals. In Part II, I describe briefly some of the main decisions on
which the reputation of the ECJ is based. The third (and longest) Part is concerned with Member
State responses to expansive lawmaking by the ECJ. The final section attempts to answer the two
questions posed at the end of the preceding paragraph.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Court ofJustice ("the ECJ" or "the Court") is
widely recognized as one of the world's most successful international tribunals and has been held up as a model for others.1 Its
reputation is in large measure based on its contribution to the
"constitutionalization" of the European Community Treaties
and to the functioning of the common market, particularly in
the 1960s and 1970s. What has perhaps received less attention is
the range of mechanisms employed by the Member States since
the late 1980s to contain what they regard as expansive lawmaking by the ECJ. Those mechanisms have sometimes generated
new waves of activism on the part of the ECJ as it has sought to
compensate for their perceived defects. Is this frosty dialogue
between the ECJ and the Member States conducive to the
healthy development of the European Union and its legal order?
If not, what can be done to break the pattern?
In Part I, I attempt to anchor discussion of these issues in
some of the academic literature on the post-war proliferation of
international courts and tribunals. In Part II, I describe briefly
some of the main decisions on which the reputation of the ECJ is
based. The third (and longest) Part is concerned with Member
State responses to expansive lawmaking by the ECJ. The final
* Professor of European Law and Head, Birmingham Law School, University of
Birmingham (UK).
1. See FRANCIS JACOBS, THE SOvEREIGN-rY OF LAw: THE EUROPEAN WAY 130-36
(2007); KATRIN NYMAN-METCALF & IOANNIS PAPAGEORGIOU, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND
COURTS OFJUSTICE 112-13 (2005); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward
a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (1997); Eric A.
Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL. L. REv. 957, 970 (2005).
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section attempts to answer the two questions posed at the end of
the preceding paragraph.
I. BACKGROUND
Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a
remarkable growth in the number and use of international
courts and tribunals. An early pace-setter was the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), set up in 1950 under the
European Convention on Human Rights. 2 It was followed soon
after by the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel
Community established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951.' That
Court was to morph into the ECJ, which now exercises jurisdiction under the Treaties on which the European Union is based.
More recent examples are the Appellate Body of the World
Trade Organization 4 and the International Criminal Court.5
How can this proliferation of international courts and tribunals
be explained? Why have so many independent States agreed to
abide by the decisions of courts and tribunals they may not be
able to control and which might interpret a treaty they have
signed in ways that run counter to their own conception of their
national interests? Heifer and Slaughter sum up the benefits
that States derive from international courts and tribunals like
this:6
Independent tribunals act as trustees to enhance the credibility of international commitments in specific multilateral contexts. They do so by raising the probability that violations of
those commitments will be detected and accurately labeled as
noncompliance. Such violations create short-term material
and reputational costs for the state in default. But detection
2. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
3. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140.
4. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International
Tribunals: A Response to ProfessorsPosner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REv. 899, 904 (2005); see also
Richard H. Steinberg, JudicialLawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutionaland Political Constraints,98 AM.J. INT'L L. 247, 273 (2004) (referring to "the frequent use of ambiguities in treaties as agreements to disagree").
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of these violations also encourages future compliance, maximizing the long-term value of the agreement to all parties to
the multilateral regime, including the defecting state. 7
Posner and Yoo suggest that such tribunals should be seen:
as a response to the problem of treaty interpretation ...
states can no more describe all contingencies in their treaties
than private parties can address all contingencies in their
contracts... an arbitrator can reduce the transaction costs of8
writing treaties by enforcing the hypothetical optimal treaty.
The increasing use of judicial mechanisms to resolve international disputes has not been universally welcomed, with some
observers, notably in the United States, seeing it as undemocratic and a threat to the achievement of national policy objectives.9 However, the trend has been applauded by scholars of
international law, who have argued that tribunals such as the
ECJ help contribute to the global rule of law.1 ° Many of the explanations given above for the establishment of international
courts and tribunals apply directly to the ECJ. As Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz observe, it may be argued that "the member
governments have given the ECJ autonomy to increase the effectiveness of the incomplete contracts the governments have
signed with each other (that is, the EU treaty base)."al They go
on:
Governments understand that having a well-defined rule of
law fosters mutually beneficial economic exchange. But it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to write complete contracts
(in the case of the EU, treaties). Delegating authority to the
ECJ is thus essential
to the efficient functioning of the rule of
2
law in Europe.
Some striking examples of the way the ECJ has used its authority are given in the next section. They illustrate clearly the
7. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 904.
8. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependence in InternationalTribunals, 93

CAL. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (2005).
9. See id. at 4-5; see also Steinberg, supra note 6, at 248.

10. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 290-98, 387. Posner & Yoo, supra note
1, at 969, state that "among international law scholars the impartiality and effectiveness
of independent international tribunals are articles of faith."
11. Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The European Court of
Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INr'L ORG.
149, 150 (1998).

12. Id. at 156.
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link between enhancing the credibility of the Member States'
commitments to each other, the rule of law and the achievement
of substantive policy aims. They also underline the importance
of the preliminary rulings procedure in empowering domestic
actors, thereby reducing the capacity of national governments to
control the development of Community law.1 3 The development of a body of precedent, treated as highly persuasive if not
formally binding, took the sting out of some decisions of the
Court by enabling it to present them as applications of established principles in new circumstances. 4 As Garrett, Kelemen
and Schulz put it: "the greater the clarity of ECJ case law precedent, the lesser the likelihood that the Court will tailor its decisions to the anticipated reactions of member governments."15
II. THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE
A. Constitutionalization
The European Community ("EC") Treaty did not say anything about the relationship between Community law and national law. Could the former be invoked in the national courts
of the Member States? If so, did it enjoy primacy over inconsistent provisions of national law? The Court drew on the inherent
logic of the Treaty to answer those questions in the affirmative,
thereby departing from the fundamental principle of international law that the effect of treaties in the national courts of the
States Parties is governed by domestic law. In a famous passage,
the Court declared in Van Gend en Loos v. NederlandseAdministratie der Belastingen:1 6
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also
their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member
States, Community law not only imposes obligations on indi13. See Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Mastersof the Treaty"?: European Governments and
the European Court ofJustice, 52 Ir'L ORG. 121, 133 (1998); Heifer & Slaughter, supra
note 6, at 903-07.
14. See ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE ch. 17
(2d ed. 2006). On the precedential significance of WTO Appellate Body decisions, see
Steinberg, supra note 6, at 254.
15. Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 11, at 150.
16. Case 26/62, [19631 E.C.R. 1, Summary
3.

1178

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1174

viduals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which
become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not
only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also
by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly
defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member
7
States and upon the institutions of the Community.'
In Costa v. E.N.E.L. less than eighteen months later, the Court
made explicit what was implicit in Van Gend en Loos, that Community law prevailed over national law in the event of a conflict. 18
The Court's decision in Van Gend en Loos involved filling a
gap in the Treaty in a way which ran counter to the views expressed by three of the then six Member States which took part
in the case,' 9 as well as those of Advocate General Roemer. However, it now seems almost self-evident that the common market
would have been undermined if the effect of the Treaty had
been permitted to vary from one Member State to another by
according it direct effect and/or primacy in only some of them.
The Court's subsequent case law made it clear that not only provisions of the Treaty, but also those of Community acts might
produce direct effect (though, in the case of directives, only
against the State and its organs).2° Many years later, the Court
went a step further by recognizing that Member States may have
to award damages to individuals to compensate them for loss
caused by the past application of national rules which were contrary to Community law. 2 ' Although the Treaty was (and remains) silent on the issue, such liability was described by Advocate General [kger in one case as the "indispensable adjunct" to
the doctrine of primacy.2 2
17. Id. 12; cf Agreement Creating the European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-6079, 21 (delivered at the end of 1991, where the Court spoke of the
Member States' having limited their sovereign rights "in ever wider fields").
18. See Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
19. Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
20. See Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth.,
Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723; Faccini Dori v. Recreb, Case C-91/92, [1994] E.C.R.
1-3325.
21. See Francovich & Others v. Italy, Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R.
1-5357.
22. See Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries and Food, Case C-5/94, [1996]
E.C.R. 1-2553, 2572. Later in the same Opinion, the Advocate General remarked: "Respect for primacy requires not only that legislation contrary to Community law should
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B. Achieving Policy Objectives
Striking illustrations of the practical importance of the doctrine of direct effect in helping the Community to achieve its
policy objectives are provided by three decisions of the Court,
two on freedom of movement and one on social policy.
Essential to the proper functioning of the common market
are the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services. These were originally the subject respectively of Articles
52 and 59 EEC, which prohibited discrimination on grounds of
nationality and required national restrictions to be abolished by
the end of the transitional period (December 31, 1969).2' Both
articles required the Council to draw up a general program setting out how freedom of movement was to be achieved. The
general programs were to be implemented by Council directive.
Although both general programs were adopted in 1961 by the
Council, it was unable to agree to the legislation necessary to
give effect to them by the end of the transitional period.2 4
The Court was called upon to consider the consequences of
this in Reyners v. Belgium,2 5 a case on the right of establishment.
It declared that, from the end of the transitional period, Article
52 "had the character of a provision which is complete in itself
and legally perfect. ' 26 The absence of Council directives could
not deprive that article of any effect:
In laying down that freedom of establishment shall be attained at the end of the transitional period, Article 52 ...
imposes an obligation to attain a precise result, the fulfilment
of which had to be made easier by, but not made dependent
on, the
implementation of a programme of progressive mea27
sures.
Thus, once the transitional period had expired, directives
were no longer necessary to give effect to the Treaty prohibition
against discrimination on grounds of nationality, which the
Treaty itself required the national courts to uphold. Six months
be disapplied. It requires also that damage resulting from its application in the past
should be made good." Id. at 2580.
23. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
24. See ARNULL, supra note 14, at 464.
25. Case 2/74, [1974] E.C.R. 631.
26. Id. 12.
27. Id. 26.
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later, the Court gave judgment in Van Binsbergen v. Bedriffsvereniging Metaalnijverheid,28 in which the approach taken in the Reyners
case was extended to Article 59 .9
In another case decided two years later, the Court took a
similar approach. Its decision was perhaps even more striking
than Reyners and Van Binsbergen because the area concernedsocial policy-might at the time have seemed tangential to the
Treaty's objectives. Among the rather anodyne provisions devoted to the subject in the Treaty, however, was one which was to
assume great practical importance. Article 119 EEC provided, in
its first paragraph, that " [e] ach Member State shall during the
first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of
the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for
equal work."3" The full implications of that provision began to
emerge in Defrenne v. Sabena,"' decided in 1976, at a time when
social policy had moved up the Community's political agenda.2
One of the issues in Defrenne was whether the applicant could
rely on Article 119 in the national courts, in other words,
whether it produced direct effect. Describing the principle of
equal pay as "part of the foundations of the Community," the
Court held that, in the case of forms of discrimination which
could be "identified solely with the aid of the criteria based on
equal work and equal pay referred to by the article in question,"
Article 119 would produce direct effect."3 Although the article
was formally addressed to the Member States, that did not preclude the grant of rights to "any individual who has an interest in
the performance of the duties thus laid down."3 4 Moreover, the
prohibition contained in the article "applies not only to the action of public authorities, but also extends to all agreements
28. Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299.
29. The year in which those cases were decided, 1974, was one in which the Court
made a particularly major contribution to completing the common market: between
the two, the Court in Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville gave a broad scope to one of its
other cornerstones-Article 28 EC on the free movement of goods. Case 8/74, [1974]
E.C.R. 837. More recently, the Court has been responsible for the rapid development
of the concept of citizenship of the Union introduced at Maastricht. See Consolidated
Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community arts. 17-22, O.J. C 321 E/
37, at E/153 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty]; ARNuLL, supra note 14, ch. 14.
30. EEC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 119.
31. Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455.
32. See generally CATHERINE BARNARD, EC EMPLOYMENT LAw 8-10 (3rd ed. 2006);
JEFF KENNER, EU EMPLOYMENT LAW:

FROM ROME TO AMSTERDAM AND BEYOND 23-26

(2003).
33. Defrenne, [1976] E.C.R. 455,
34. Id. 31.

18.
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which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as
to contracts between individuals."" In other words, Article 119
was capable of producing not just vertical but also horizontal direct effect, even where this meant interfering with the terms of
private contracts and collective labor agreements.
The referring court had asked from what date Article 119
might produce direct effect. The text of the article36 might have
appeared to provide the answer to that question, but doubt had
arisen because of differing views taken by the Member States and
the Commission about its practical implications. The Court acknowledged that their conduct had created uncertainty as to the
effect of Article 119. In those circumstances, the Court concluded that, except in the case of those who had already brought
proceedings, Article 119 could not be invoked in support of
claims for equal pay in respect of periods which preceded the
date of the Court's judgment. 7 The Court had never before
limited the temporal effect of one of its judgments in this way. It
was criticized for doing so by Hamson.3" He argued that the
power to declare what the law is as to the future but to leave the
past untouched was "inherently the mark of the legislative function" and that the Court had been compelled to take this position because of its over-enthusiastic development of the doctrine
of direct effect.3 " Although the device is used very sparingly, I
shall refer below to another case, again concerning Article 119,
where it was employed by the Court.
C. The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice
The Court's constitutionalizing tendencies were evident not
only at the interface of Community law and national law, but
also in relation to the'scope of its own jurisdiction. Here the
Court found support in Article 164 (now 220) EC, which requires it to ensure that "the law"-one might say the rule of
law4°-is observed in the interpretation and application of the
EC Treaty. That duty played an important part in another case
35. Id. 39.
36. The first stage of the transitional period ended December 31, 1961. The text
stated: "Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain . .. ." EEC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 119.
37. April 8, 1976.
38. C. J. Hamson, Methods of Interpretation-A Citical Assessment of the Results, in
REPORTS OF A JUDICIAL AND ACADEMIC CONFERENCE

11-15 (1976).

39. Id.
40. SeejAcoBs, supra note 1, at 37; Anthony Arnull, The Rule of Law in the Euro-
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in which the Court engaged in a conspicuous exercise in gapfilling. Before the amendments introduced at Maastricht, the
Council and the Commission were the only Community institutions referred to in Article 173 (now 230) EC, the Treaty provision on annulment proceedings. 41 The status of the European
Parliament under that provision became the subject of great
controversy, particularly after the first set of direct elections to
the Parliament in 1979.42
In Les Verts v. European Parliament, the Court held that its
jurisdiction under Article 173 was not limited to measures
In so doing, it
adopted by the Council and the Commission.
made a series of highly significant statements about the nature
of the system established by the Treaty and the importance of
judicial review. It began by emphasizing that the Community
was based on the rule of law and that neither the Member States
nor the institutions could avoid review of whether the measures
they adopted were compatible with the Treaty, described by the
Court as "the basic constitutional charter."4 4 The Treaty, it said,
"established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures
designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of
measures adopted by the institutions." 45 Although Article 230
only mentioned acts of the Council and the Commission, the
general scheme of the Treaty was to make a direct action available against any measure adopted by the institutions which was
intended to have legal effect. The Court concluded:
An interpretation of Article 173 of the Treaty which excluded
measures adopted by the European Parliament from those
which could be contested would lead to a result contrary both
to the spirit of the Treaty as expressed in Article 164 and to its
system. Measures adopted by the European Parliament in the
context of the EEC Treaty could encroach on the powers of
the Member States or of the other institutions, or exceed the
pean Union, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 239-55
(Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott eds., 2002).
41. See Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht
Agreement, 42 INr'L & CoMp. L.Q. 213, 228 (1993).
42. See RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTiCE 97-104 (1998); Kieran
Bradley, The Variable Evolution of the Standing of the European Parliament in Proceedings
before the Court ofJustice, 8 Y.B. EUR. UNION L. 27 (1988).
43. Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339.
44. Id. 23.
45. Id.
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limits which have been set to the Parliament's powers, without its being possible to refer them for review by the Court. It
must therefore be concluded that an action for annulment
may lie against measures adopted by the European Parliament intended to have legal effects vis-d-vis third parties.4 6
What about the Parliament's capacity to bring annulment
proceedings?

After some hesitation,4 7 the Court held in the

case48

Chernobyl
that the Parliament had the right to bring such
proceedings where their purpose was to protect its prerogatives.
Since the Court was responsible under the Treaties for ensuring
respect for the law, it had to be able to protect the institutional
balance and the prerogatives of the Parliament. The fact that
the Treaties contained no provisions conferring on the Parliament the right to bring annulment proceedings might constitute
"a procedural gap,"4 9 but this could not be allowed to outweigh
the fundamental need to ensure respect for the institutional balance created by the Treaties. Since the Parliament had claimed
that it had not been able to participate to the full extent contemplated by the Treaty in the legislative process leading to the
adoption of the contested act, its prerogatives were in issue. The
action was therefore admissible.
The decisions in Les Verts and Chernobyl are regarded by
some of the Court's critics as typifying its predilection for expansive lawmaking.5 ° However, the main consideration underlying
the Court's decision in Les Verts seems to have been a desire to
ensure that no institution which had acquired the power to
adopt acts affecting the legal rights of third parties could escape
judicial review." The result was to provide a judicial remedy
when the Parliament exceeded the limits of its powers.5 2 The
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. 25.
See Parliament v. Council, Case 302/87, [1988] E.C.R. 1-5615.
Parliament v. Council, Case C-70/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2041.
Id. 26.
See, e.g., SIR PATRICK NEILL, THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE: A CASE STUDY IN
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 29, 46 (European Policy Forum 1995); see also TREVOR C. HARTLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 35-36 (1999); TREVOR C. HARTLEY,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 74-76 (6th ed. 2007); Trevor C. Hartley, The European Court,Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union, 112
L.Q. Rev. 95, 101 (1996).
51. See Parti 6cologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986]
E.C.R. 1-1339, 1 2, 24, 25.
52. The value of that remedy to the Council and the Member States was emphasized soon afterwards when the Court upheld a claim brought against the Parliament by
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Chernobyl decision was motivated by the related consideration
that there was no point in including in the Treaty detailed rules
about the Parliament's prerogatives if those prerogatives could
be ignored by the other institutions with impunity. The Court
was again concerned to ensure that the institutions acted within
the limits of their powers, an essential attribute of the rule of
law, which it was the Court's duty to uphold. At Maastricht, the
Member States amended the text of Article 173 (now 230) to
give effect to both decisions.
An equally bold example of gap filling, this time in the interests of maintaining the unity of the Community legal order, is
provided by the Court's decision in Foto-Frostv. Hauptzollamt Liibeck-Ost,5 4 a reference under Article 234 (ex 177) EC concerning
the role of national courts when confronted with a challenge to
the validity of a Community act. While national courts of last
resort are in principle required by the third paragraph of Article
234 to refer such questions to the Court, the Treaty appears to
leave inferior courts free to decide them for themselves. However, it would be highly undesirable for a national court to declare a Community act invalid in the absence of a ruling to that
effect from the Court of Justice. The decision of the national
court would not take effect in other Member States, where the
contested act would in principle continue to apply. The result
would be to undermine legal certainty and the uniform application of Community law. The Court accordingly held that, while
national courts could reject unfounded challenges to the validity
of Community acts, they did not have the power to declare such
acts invalid. 5 The requirement of uniformity, which it was the
purpose of Article 234 to ensure, was "particularly imperative"
when the validity of a Community act was in issue: "Divergences
between courts in the Member States as to the validity of Community acts would be liable to place in jeopardy the very unity of
the Community legal order and detract from the fundamental
the Council, supported by the German, French and United Kingdom Governments. See
Council v. European Parliament, Case 34/86, [1986] E.C.R. 2155,
2, 5, 8.
53. See Consolidated Version of the The Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 321 E/
1 (2006) [hereinafter TEU]. The European Parliament was finally elevated to the status of a privileged applicant by the Treaty of Nice.
54. Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lflbeck-Ost., Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199, 1.
55. The rule is qualified in proceedings before national courts for interim measures. See id. 19; Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft v. Bundesamt ffir Erndhrung und
Forstwirtschaft, Case C-465/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3761.
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requirement of legal certainty." 56 The Court pointed out that it
had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain actions for the annulment
of Community acts. The "coherence of the system of judicial
protection established by the Treaty"5 7 required that, where the
validity of a Community act was challenged before a national
court, the power to declare the act invalid should also be reserved to the Court of Justice.
Foto-Frost was a genuinely difficult case and once again the
decision was the subject of criticism. 58 There is certainly force in
the argument that the terms of Article 234 do not support the
view that all national courts, whether or not covered by the third
paragraph of the article, are bound to refer questions of validity
to the Court. Advocate General Mancini said that he considered
that "the elliptical wording of Article [234] is attributable to a
singular but not impossible oversight" on the part of the Treaty's
authors. 59 In his view, the textual arguments led to "such dangerous and anomalous results as to overshadow the undeniable
uneasiness which one feels in rejecting them."6 The judgment
achieved directly what could have been achieved indirectly by
laying down strict guidelines for the national courts on the exercise of their discretion to refer in validity cases, something which
would clearly have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Unlike Les Verts and Chernobyl, however, Foto-Frosthas never been
embodied in an amendment to the Treaty.
III. MEMBER STATE RESPONSES TO EXPANSIVE LAWMAKING
BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE
The relationship between an international tribunal and the
states which set it up has been likened to that which exists between a principal and an agent. As Posner and Yoo point out,
"whenever a principal relies on an agent, it incurs the risk that
the agent will perform inadequately or self-interestedly ...this is
the problem of agency slack."61 It may result in decisions which
56. See Foto-Frost, [1987] E.C.R. 4199,
57. Id.
58. See NEILL, supra note 50, at 36-40;
EUROPEAN UNION,

1.
HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE

supra note 50, at 34; Hartley, The European Court, supra note 50, at

100.
59. Foto-Frost, [1987] E.C.R. 4199, 5.
60. Id.
61. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 8, at 23.

1186

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1174

fall outside the "win set" of the participating states, that is, the
range of responses that they consider acceptable. To put the
point another way, agency slack may lead a tribunal to give decisions which go beyond the limits of the "strategic space ' 62 within
which the contracting states are content to allow it to operate.
What can states do ex ante to prevent such decisions from being
taken? How might they react ex post if they are?
Helfer and Slaughter6 3 offer a typology of the mechanisms
available to contracting states. The ex ante mechanisms they
identify include:
" Precisely defined substantive rules;
" Reservations to substantive rules;
* Reservations to a tribunal's jurisdiction;
* Rules to regulate access and procedure.
The ex post mechanisms they identify include:
* Reinterpretation of substantive rules;
* Challenges to the legitimacy of a tribunal or of a particular decision;
64
" Noncompliance or partial compliance.
Helfer and Slaughter also refer to a more amorphous category
of so-called "discursive constraints ...

generated by interactions

among participants in the global community of law and internalized by tribunal members."6 5 Writing about political constraints
on expansive judicial lawmaking by the World Trade Organization Appellate Body, Steinberg6 6 adds a further ex post mechanism: unilateral exit.
To what extent, if any, have devices like these been used to
constrain lawmaking by the ECJ? Alter remarks:
Because of the decision-making rules of the EU, the political
threat to alter the Court's role is usually not credible. The
ECJ can safely calculate that political controversy will not
translate into an attack on its institutional standing, thus it
will not need to6 reconcile
its behavior with a country's politi7
cal preferences.
62. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 275.
63. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at Table 3.
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 267.
67. See Alter, supra note 13, at 138-39.

2008]

ME AND MY SHADOW

1187

She quotes an observation by Pollack about the procedure for
amending the Treaty, which requires the agreement of all the
Member States followed by ratification by each one in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.6 8 Because of the
cumbersome nature of that procedure, Pollack calls it "a relatively ineffective and noncredible means of member state control."6 9 Alter acknowledges that decisions of the ECJ on the
meaning of a Community act may in principle be reversed by
amending the act in question, but says that this happens relatively infrequently "because ECJ decisions usually affect member
states differently, so there is not a coalition of support to change
the disputed legislation. "70
Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz also draw attention to the difficulty of amending the Treaties, while pointing out that the
growth in qualified majority voting since the Single European
Act has reduced the difficulty of securing the passage of amending legislation. 7 ' None the less, they say that it may be argued
that "the judges of the ECJ realize that their power is ultimately
contingent on the acquiescence of member states and hence are
reticent to make decisions of which governments disapprove. "72
The "specter of coordinated responses" to the case law, they say,
73
"will make the ECJ more reticent to make adverse decisions.
Moreover, they point out that the Court's capacity to develop its
case law as it sees fit "is contingent on a stable statutory and constitutional base in which governments allow the ECJ considerable latitude in the translation of its general mandate into specific
decisions."74
For the first thirty years or so of its existence-from the entry into force of the EEC Treaty to that of the Single European
Act-the ECJ did indeed benefit from a "stable statutory and
constitutional base. ' 75 During that period, the Treaty base remained substantially unchanged and the Luxembourg Compro68. See TEU, supra note 53, art. 48, O.J. C231 E/l, at E/34.
69. See Alter, supra note 13, at 139 (quoting Mark Pollack, Delegation, Agency and
Agenda Setting in the EC, 51 INr'L ORG. 99, 119 (1997)).
70. Id. at 136; see Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 11, at 160.
71. In many cases it remains necessary for the Commission to submit an appropriate proposal. See Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 11, at 160.
72. Id. at 150.
73. Id. at 151.
74. Id. at 155.
75. Id.
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mise cast its long shadow over decision-making in the Council.
It was then that the Court laid the foundations of the new legal
order with its decisions in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L.
and took the initiative in kick-starting the common market in
cases like Reyners, Van Binsbergen and Defrenne.7 6 Attempts by
France, the author of the empty-chair crisis of 1965 which led to
the Luxembourg Compromise, to curb the power of the Court
in 196877 and again in 198078 came to naught because of lack of
support from the other Member States.
The signing of the Single European Act in 1986, however,
inaugurated a long period of constitutional instability (which the
Treaty of Lisbon may finally bring to an end) 79 in which the
Treaty amendment procedure did not prevent the Member
States from confronting the activism of the Court. Although, as
noted above, some bold decisions-Les Verts and Chernobyl, for
example-were in fact subsequently incorporated in the Treaty,
the range of devices Member States have used to contain the
Court is often underestimated. In what follows, I divide them
into five categories modeled on those identified by Helfer and
Slaughter and by Steinberg. They are as follows: (a) defining
and reinterpreting rules and reservations; (b) restricting jurisdiction and controlling procedure; (c) delegitimization and noncompliance; (d) exit; and (e) discursive constraints.
A. Defining and ReinterpretingRules and Reservations
This began in a small way. As is well known, the Single European Act was intended to compensate for the Community's
failure to establish a properly functioning common market by
providing for the completion of a so-called internal market by a
new deadline, December 31, 1992. It was envisaged that this
76. See Alter, supra note 13, at 132.
77. See id.
78. See Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 11, at 164; see also HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 354-55 (1986).
79. The Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon on December 13, 2007. The
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting, held the following day,
make it clear that the new Treaty is intended to provide the Union "with a stable and
lasting institutional framework" and that the Member States "expect no change in the
foreseeable future." Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions-Brussels, Dec. 14, 2007, 16616/1/07 REV 1, 6 (Feb. 14, 2008). Institutional matters are
expressly excluded from the mandate of the Reflection Group set up to identify the key
issues the Union is likely to face in the longer term. Id. 9.
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would be done on the basis of a new Article 100a (now 95) EC,
which for the first time permitted the Council to adopt by qualified majority vote measures for the approximation of national
laws. However, mindful of the way the ECJ had, in Reyners, Van
Binsbergen and Deftenne, treated deadlines originally laid down in
the Treaty, the Member States issued a declaration that stated:
"Setting the date of 31 December 1992 does not create an automatic legal effect."" ° The declaration was not legally binding
and the deadline was in any event largely met. l None the less, it
proved to be the harbinger of more elaborate attempts by the
Member States to restrict the interpretative possibilities open to
the Court.
The Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in
1991 contained three legally-binding protocols conceived as di8 2
rect responses to the case law of the Court. Two-on abortion
and property in Denmark," respectively-were intended to address concerns specific to individual Member States, but the
third was of general application and concerned the principle
which the Court had in Deftenne described as part of the foundations of the Community, that of equal pay for men and women
laid down in Article 119 EEC. In Barber,8 4 the Court had to decide whether that article applied to a private occupational pension scheme which laid down different pensionable ages for men
and women. The Court pointed out that such schemes derived
from the employment relationship between their members and
a particular employer, by whom they were financed. It followed
that Article 119 was infringed where they laid down pensionable
80. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 23).
81. See Criminal Proceedings Against WiJsenbeek, Case C-378/97, [1999] E.C.R. I6207; see also A.G. Toth, The Legal Status of the DeclarationsAnnexed to the Single European
Act, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 803 (1986); H.G. Schermers, The Effect of the Date 31
December 1992, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 275 (1991); Stine Andersen & Andrew Glen-

cross, Pre-Empting the Court: Member State Expectations, Political Oversight and the
Nexus of Law and Politics in the EU (paper presented at the EUSA Biennial Conference, Montreal (May 17-19, 2007)).
82. See Soc'y for the Prot. of the Unborn Child Ir. v. Grogan & Others, Case
C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4685 (prompting the protocol annexed to the Treaty on
European Union and to the Treaties establishing the European Communities).
83. See Commission v. Greece, Case 305/87, [1989] E.C.R 1461 (prompting the
protocol on the acquisition of property in Denmark).
84. Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, Case C-262/88, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-1889.
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ages which varied according to a member's gender.8 5 However,
the use of pensionable ages which differed in this way was widespread in the Member States. Moreover, two Council directives
had encouraged the belief among interested parties that this was
lawful. To avoid upsetting the financial balance of schemes
based on different pensionable ages for men and women, the
Court therefore ruled that the direct effect of Article 119 "may
not be relied upon in order to claim entitlement to a pension
with effect from a date prior to that of this judgment" except by
those who had already brought legal proceedings.8 6
Unfortunately, the words "entitlement to a pension" were
ambiguous.8 7 Did they mean that equality was required in relation to pensions paid after the date of the judgment (May 17,
1990) or only in relation to contributions paid in respect of periods of employment completed after that date? In the later case of
Ten Oever,88 Advocate General van Gerven said that "the practical
importance of the answer to this question is enormous" 9 and
observed that the second of the two alternatives set out above
"would deprive the Barber judgment of almost all retroactive effect. In practical terms, it would mean that the full effect of the
judgment would be felt only after a period of about 40 years." 90
The ambiguity created by the Barber judgment prompted
the Member States to take action. The Maastricht Treaty included a protocol 91 attributing to the Court's ruling the most
limited form of retroactive effect compatible with the terms of
the judgment. It stated:
For the purposes of Article 119 of this Treaty, benefits under
occupational social security schemes shall not be considered
as remuneration if and in so far as they are attributable to
periods of employment prior to 17 May 1990, except in the
85. Id. 1 3.
86. Id. 45.
87. This seems to have been due to a blunder by the Court. See ARNULL, supra note
14, at 550. However, Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz suggest that the Court "may have
made a vague ruling in order to gauge the reaction of member governments." Garrett,
Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 11, at 166.
88. Ten Oever v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor het Glazenwassers-en
Schoonmaakbedrijf, Case C-109/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4879, 1 10.
89. Id. As Advocate General van Gerven pointed out, there were a number of
intermediate possibilities. See id.
90. Id.
91. Protocol concerning Article 119, O.J. C 191/68 (1992) (the so-called "Barber
Protocol").
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case of workers or those claiming under them who have
an
before that date initiated legal proceedings or introduced
92
equivalent claim under the applicable national law.
The Ten Oever case was decided shortly before the Maastricht
Treaty entered into force. The Court was not therefore bound,
when the case fell to be decided, by the terms of the BarberProtocol. Be that as it may, the Court ruled that, subject to the normal
exception for those who had already brought a claim, "equality
of treatment in the matter of occupational pensions may be
claimed only in relation to benefits payable in respect of periods
of employment subsequent to 17 May 1990, the date of the Barberjudgment."9 3 The ruling in Ten Oever on the temporal effect
of Barber was subsequently confirmed on several occasions,9 4 although it soon became apparent that, if it was unwilling to directly challenge the understanding of the Barber ruling embodied in the protocol, the Court was not prepared to give it a broad
interpretation."
At Amsterdam, Article 119 was again the subject of a Treaty
change apparently designed to reverse a decision of the Court.
In Kalanke v. Bremen, the Court had restrictively interpreted a
provision on affirmative action contained in a directive on equal
treatment for men and women.9 6 The Court's decision proved
to be out of keeping with the prevailing political climate. The
Member States accordingly agreed to insert in Article 119 (now
141) a new paragraph 4, providing:
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men
and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment
shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or
adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order
to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a
vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvan92. Id.
19.
93. Ten Oever, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4879,
94. See, e.g., Moroni v. Collo GmbH, Case C-110/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6591; Neath
v. Steeper, Case C-152/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6935; Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd. v. Russell, Case C-200/91, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4389.
95. See Defrenne v. Sabena SA, Case C-166/99, [2000] E.C.R. 1-6155; DEI v. Evrenopoulos, Case C-147/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2057; Vroege v. NCIV Instituut voor Volkshuisvesting BV & Stichting Pensioenfonds NCIV, Case C-57/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4541;
Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v. G.A. Beune, Case C-7/93,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-4471.
96. See Kalanke v. Bremen, Case C-450/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3051.
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97
tages in professional careers.

A declaration (No. 28) adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") made it clear that, despite its gender-neutral
language, that paragraph was intended to be of benefit primarily
to women. 98 Its practical effect seems so far to have been marginal.
In the run-up to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the United Kingdom made certain more general suggestions for reducing the
influence of the Court.9 9 One was for a simplified procedure for
the amendment of Council legislation which had been interpreted by the Court in a way which failed to reflect the intentions of its authors, a suggestion designed to overcome any reluctance on the part of the Commission to submit the necessary
proposals. Another was that a protocol should be annexed to
the Treaties to the effect that, "when faced with more than one
possible interpretation of provisions of Community law, the
Court shall, unless there is a clear contrary intention, prefer the
interpretation which least constrains the freedom of the Member States."10 °
These proposals did not find favor with the other Member
States, but they did agree to make special provision for certain
Member States (including the United Kingdom) which had concerns about the activism of the Court. The Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland was intended to limit
the effect in those Member States of provisions on visas, asylum,
immigration and other policies related to the free movement of
persons in a new Tide IV inserted in Part Three of the EC
Treaty.10 1 Article 2 of the Protocol provides as follows:
[N] one of the provisions of Tide IV of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, no measure adopted pursuant to
that Title, no provision of any international agreement concluded by the Community pursuant to that Title, and no deci97. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, O.J. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
98. Declaration (No. 28) on Article 119(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. C 340, at 136.
99. See Anthony Arnull, The ECJ, the UK and the IGC, 21 EUR. L. REV. 349 (1996).
100. Id. at 349-50.
101. See Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, Oj. C 310/
353 (2004) [hereinafter United Kingdom and Ireland Protocol]; see also Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 97, O.J. C 340.

2008]

ME AND MY SHADOW

1193

sion of the Court ofJustice interpreting any such provision or
measure shall be binding upon or applicable in the United
Kingdom or Ireland; and no such provision, measurse or decision shall in any way affect the competences, rights and obligations of those States; and no such provision, measure or
decision shall in any way affect the acquis communautairenor
form part of Community
law as they apply to the United King10 2
dom or Ireland.

The drafting of that provision, redolent of the common law style,
is quite unlike that of the EC Treaty, at least in its original form.
It was evidently designed to protect the United Kingdom (and
Ireland) even from judges as inventive as those of the Court of
Justice. Its effect on the cohesion of the Community legal order
was more serious than that of the responses to the case law we
have so far considered because it excluded the two Member
States concerned (though they could opt in if they wished)1" 3
from a policy area in which nearly all the other Member States
were to participate. A similar provision was included in the Protocol on the position of Denmark. 10 4 Both provisions will continue to apply after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
The Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights led to both an
attempt to fetter the Court's lawmaking and special arrangements for two Member States. 105 Solemnly proclaimed by the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for the
first time in Nice in December 2000, the Charter was not initially
legally binding. 10 6 Nonetheless, it had been drafted with a view
to its acquiring binding force in the future and it was incorporated in the Constitutional Treaty. The so-called horizontal provisions of the Charter, however, dealing with its interpretation
102. United Kingdom and Ireland Protocol, supra note 101, art. 2, O.J. C. 310/
353.
103. Cf United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-77/05 (ECJ Dec. 18, 2007) (not yet
reported); United Kingdom v. Council, Case C-137/05 (ECJ Dec. 18, 2007) (not yet
reported).
104. See EC Treaty, supra note 29, Protocol on the position of Denmark, O.J. C 321
E/37, at E/201.
105. See generally Andersen & Glencross, supra note 81.
106. The Court has nonetheless recently begun to cite it as an element of its reasoning. See, e.g., Laval un Partneri, Case C-341/05 (Dec. 18 2007) (not yet reported);
Int'l Transport Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line, Case C-438/05 (Dec. 11, 2007) (not yet
reported); Advocaten voor de Wereld, Case C-303/05 (May 3, 2007) (not yet reported);
Unibet, Case C-432/05 (Mar. 13, 2007) (not yet reported); Parliament v. Council, Case
C-540/03 (June 27, 2006) (not yet reported).
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and application, were amended to contain its potential effect on
national law, particularly national constitutions.10 7 Moreover,
while the substantive provisions of the Charter were left unchanged, a set of "explanations" drawn up when the Charter was
originally drafted to provide guidance on its interpretation were
reinforced and accorded enhanced status.1 0 8 The intention
seems to have been to limit the strategic space of the ECJ (and
other courts) when ruling on the meaning and effect of the
Charter. 10 9 The Treaty of Lisbon gives legal effect to the modified version of the Charter 1 0 and refers specifically to its horiMoreover, it purports
zontal provisions and the explanations.'
to qualify the effect of the Charter in two Member States (Poland and the United Kingdom)." 2
B. Restricting Access and Controlling Procedure

Since Maastricht, the Member States have imposed a series
of formal restrictions on the Court's jurisdiction to enable them
to bring within the scope of the Treaties particular areas of policy without subjecting them to every aspect of the so-called Com107. See Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe arts. 11-112, 11-113, O.J. C
310/1 (2004) [hereinafter Constitutional Treaty].
108. The explanations were not mentioned in the original text of the Charter. See
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ. C 364/1 (2000) [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. Article 11-112(7) required the courts of the Union
and the Member States to give the explanations "due regard." Constitutional Treaty,
supra note 107, art. 11-112(7). In addition, the Charter preamble was altered to include
a reference to them.
109. See in particular the explanation of the relationship between Article 11-107
(enshrining the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) and the admissibility of
annulment actions.
110. The modified version was solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament,
the Council and the Commission in Strasbourg on December 12, 2007, the day before
the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in Lisbon. see Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. C
303/1 (2007). The modified version will replace the original version as from the entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
111. See TEU, supra note 53, art. 6(1), as amended. For the text of the modified
explanations, see Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. C.
303/17 (2007).
112. See Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, O.J. C
306/1 (2007), at 156; see also id., Declaration by the Czech Republic on the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 306/01, at 267; id., Declaration by
the Republic of Poland on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
O.J. C 306/01, at 270; id. Declaration by the Republic of Poland on the application of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in Relation to Poland and
the United Kingdom, O.J. C 306/01, at 270.
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munity method. Thus, Article L (later 46) of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") excluded from the jurisdiction of the
Court all the new provisions on foreign and security policy (Title
V, the "second pillar") and virtually all those on justice and
home affairs (Title VI, the "third pillar"), t"' The second pillar,
whose origins lay in Title III of the Single European Act on European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, has remained
essentially intergovernmental in nature, 1 4 as perhaps befits its
nature. The third pillar has been brought progressively within
the jurisdiction of the Court, but in a way which reveals deep
misgivings among at least some Member States about the way it
discharges its functions.
At Amsterdam, the Member States introduced into the
Treaties a series of new provisions designed to establish an "Area
of Freedom Security and Justice" ("AFSJ"). The relevant provisions were split between the third pillar (renamed "Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters") and the first pillar,
where, as mentioned above, a new Title IV was inserted in Part
Three of the EC Treaty. Both sets of provisions were brought
within the jurisdiction of the Court, but not in the classic manner. The most striking innovations concerned the preliminary
rulings procedure. Separate procedures were devised for Title
IV and for the third pillar, each of which differed from the procedure laid down in Article 234 EC.
Under Article 68 EC,1" 5 only national courts of last resort
may-and indeed must-seek preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Title IV and the validity and interpretation of acts of
the institutions based on it. Provision is also made for the Council, the Commission and the Member States to ask the Court for
a ruling on how the provisions of the Title and acts adopted
under it should be interpreted. 1 6 However, lower national
113. See TEU, supra note 53, art. 46, O.J. C. 321 E/l, at E/33.
114. See id., art. 11(1), O.J. C 321 E/1, at E/14 (as amended) & art. 240a TFEU.
115. EC Treaty Article 67(2) enables the provisions of Title IV concerning the
Court to be adapted by the Council. In June 2006, the Commission issued a communication suggesting that the Council should align the jurisdiction of the Court under that
Title with the general scheme of the EC Treaty. See Commission of the European Communities, Adaptation of the provisions of Title 1V of the Treaty establishing the European Community relating to the jurisdiction of the Court ofJustice with a view to ensuring more effective judicial protection, COM (2006) 346 Final, at 3 (June 2006). That
suggestion may now have been overfaken by the Treaty of Lisbon.
116. Rulings given by the Court in response to such requests do not affect judg-
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courts have no power to ask the Court for preliminary rulings in
cases covered by Title IV. 117 In addition, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on Council measures "relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.""' This self-evidently makes the procedure less effective in
securing the uniform application of the law and upholding individual rights.' 1 9 Although ostensibly based on a wish to prevent
the Court from being inundated by references in immigration
and asylum cases, the removal of the right to refer from lower
national courts seems to have been motivated in part by a desire
20
to contain the influence of the Court.
The preliminary rulings procedure applicable post Amsterdam to the third pillar differs even more fundamentally from the
classic procedure of Article 234. Article 35(1) TEU confers on
the Court jurisdiction "to give preliminary rulings on the validity
and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the
interpretation of conventions established under this Title and
on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing
them.' 2 ' However, under Article 35(2), Member States may
122
choose whether or not to accept the Court's jurisdiction.
Those who wish to do so may opt to allow all their courts to refer
or confine the right to refer to their top courts. 123 In neither
case does the Treaty impose an obligation to refer on such
courts. 12 4 Again, the Court's jurisdiction is limited in cases involving law and order and internal security.
It may also be noted that Article 35 (6), in terms reminiscent
of Article 230 EC, gives the Court jurisdiction to review the legalments of national courts which have become resjudicata.See EC Treaty, supra note 29,
art. 68(3), O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/70.
117. See id. art. 68(1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/70.
118. See id. art. 68(2), OJ. C 321 E/37, at E/70.
119. See the Court's report on the application of the TEU, Wkly. Proc. of the Ct.
of Just. 15/95 (May 22-26, 1995).
120. See Alter, supra note 13, at 9.
121. TEU, supra note 53, O.J. C 321 E/l, at E/27.
122. Of the twenty-seven Member States, fifteen have, at the time of writing, made
declarations under Article 35(2) TEU accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. See Koenraad Lenaerts, The Rule of Law and the Coherenceof theJudicialSystem of the European Union,
44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1625, 1633 n.49 (2007).
123. Of the fifteen Member States who have accepted the Court's jurisdiction
under Article 35(2) TEU, two (Spain and Hungary) have, at the time of writing this
paragraph, confined the right to refer to their highest courts. See id.
124. Cf EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 234, third para., OJ. C 321 E/37, at 147-48.
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ity of framework decisions and decisions adopted under the
third pillar, but only in actions brought by a Member State or
the Commission. 125 Private parties have no right to bring such
proceedings. Article 35(7) TEU gives the Court jurisdiction to
rule on certain disputes between Member States or between
Member States and the Commission.1 2 6 However, there is no
provision for the Commission to bring infringement proceedings against Member States it considers to be in breach of their
1 27
third pillar obligations.
These provisions may be said to have represented an advance on those in force previously, but they raised jurisdictional
questions of considerable complexity. The Court in its case law
has sought to compensate for their shortcomings and, as far as
possible, to eliminate divergences from the "gold standard" represented by its classic powers under the EC Treaty. Three cases
in particular are worth mentioning. The first two concern preliminary references under Article 35(1) TEU, while the third
concerns annulment proceedings.
In the first case, Pupino,1 28 a reference made under Article
35 TEU, the Court emphasized the parallels between that provision and Article 234 EC and proceeded to apply its case law
under the latter article on the types of body entitled to refer and
the admissibility of references. More dramatically, the Court
went on to hold that the duty of consistent interpretation applicable under the EC Treaty extended to framework decisions
adopted under the third pillar, even though the TEU contained
no equivalent of Article 10 (ex 5) EC, which had played an im29
portant part in the development of that duty.'
The Court went even further in the second case, Gestoras
125. In Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7879, an action for
annulment brought by the Commission under Article 35(6) TEU, the Court controversially quashed a third pillar framework decision on the use of the criminal law to protect the environment on the ground that it should have been adopted under the EC
Treaty. See Commission v. Council, Case C-440/05, (ECJ Oct. 23, 2007) (not yet reported).
126. See TEU, supra note 53, art. 35(7), O.J. C 321 E/l, at E/28.
127. On the consequences of the lack of any provision for infringement proceedings under the third pillar, see Lenaerts, supra note 122, 1639-40.
128. Case C-105/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5285.
129. See Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, Case
C-106/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-4135, 8.
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Pro-Amnistia v. Council, 3 ' which raised the legal status of common positions adopted by the Council under the third pillar.
The Court accepted that Article 35 TEU did not give itjurisdiction to hear actions for damages. 13 1 Drawing on case law concerning the action for annulment under the EC Treaty, however,
it ruled that the right to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 35 TEU existed "in respect of all measures
adopted by the Council, whatever their nature or form, which
13 2
are intended to have legal effects in relation to third parties.9
It was therefore imperative "to make subject to review by the
Court a common position which, because of its content, has a
scope going beyond that assigned by the EU Treaty to that kind
of act." 133 A national court which had serious doubts about
whether a common position was intended to produce such effects could therefore make a reference to the Court under Article 35 TEU, even though Article 35 (1) did not refer to common
positions.

1 34

In the third case, Airport Transit Visas, 1 5 the Commission
sought the annulment of a joint action adopted by the Council
under the original version of the third pillar, which made no
provision for the Court to review the legality of such acts. The
Commission had brought the action under Article 230 EC, but
the United Kingdom Government argued that the Court had no
jurisdiction since the contested act had been adopted outside
the framework of the EC Treaty. If that argument had prevailed,
the Court would have been unable to prevent the Council and
the Member States from evading the decision-making processes
laid down in the EC Treaty. The Court therefore rejected it. Article M (now 47) TEU, 136 which the Court had jurisdiction to
apply,13 7 made it clear that measures such as the contested joint
130. Case C-354/04 P, [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 22; see also Segi v. Council, Case C-355/04
P, [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 23; cf Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d'Iran v. Council, Case T-228/02, [2007] 1 C.M.L.R. 34 [hereinafter OMPI].
46.
131. See Gestoras Pro-Amnistia, [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 22,
132. Id. 53.
133. Id. 54.
116.
134. Cf id., Opinion by Advocate General Mengozzi, 2 C.M.L.R. 22,
135. Commission v. Council, Case C-170/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2763; cf OMPI,
[2007] 1 C.M.L.R. 34; Spain v. Eurojust, Case C-160/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2077.
136. Cf Constitutional Treaty, supra note 107, art. 111-308, O.J. C 310/1, at 138
(2004); see Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 112, art. 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 32 (inserting a
new art. 25b TEU).
137. See TEU, supra note 53, art. 47, O.J. C 321 E/l, at E/33.
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action were not intended to affect the EC Treaty. The Court
declared: "It is therefore the task of the Court to ensure that
acts which, according to the Council, fall within the scope of...
the Treaty on European Union, do not encroach upon the pow1 38
ers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community."
The position would have been greatly simplified by the Constitutional Treaty, which would have replaced Title IV EC and
Title VI TEU with a single set of provisions on the AFSJ, all of
which would in principle have been subject to the classic powers
of the Court. The only remnant of the present regime1 39 would
have limited the Court's jurisdiction in cases involving law and
order and internal security. The Treaty of Lisbon will have essentially the same effect. For a transitional period of five years
from its entry into force, however, the pre-existing powers of the
Court under the third pillar will continue to apply to Union acts
in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Once that transitional period has ended, those acts will cease to
apply to one Member State (the United Kingdom) if 40it does not
wish to accept the powers of the Court in this area.1
It is also worth noting in this context the very limited reforms contained in the Constitutional Treaty, 41 and later incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon, 14 2 to the standing rules applicable to private applicants in annulment actions before the Union
Courts (ECJ and Court of First Instance). To cut a long story
short, the effect of the existing rules is that private applicants
may only seek the annulment of Community acts which are not
addressed to them where they can establish direct and individual
concern. Two cases decided in 2002143 underlined the capacity
of the latter concept to deprive private applicants of effective ju138. Commission v. Council, Case C-170/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2763,
16.
139. See Constitutional Treaty, supra note 107, art. 111-377, O.J. C 310/1, at 163.
140. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 112, Protocol on Transitional Provisions art.
10, O.J. C 306/1, at 163. Union acts in the field of police cooperation and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon which are subsequently amended will continue to apply to Denmark in their
original form. See id., Protocol on the Position of Denmark art. 2, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/
201.
141. See Constitutional Treaty, supra note 107, art. 111-365(4), O.J. C 310/1, at 160.
142. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 112, art. 2, O.J. C.306/1, 109 (amending art.
230(4) of the EC Treaty).
143. See Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6677; see asoJgo-Qur v. Commission, Case T-177/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365.
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dicial protection of their rights. To avoid that result, in one of
them, Advocate General Jacobs proposed a new, more relaxed,
test of individual concern which would have permitted the applicants to proceed. 144 The ECJ, however, said that reform of the
system currently in force would require the Treaty to be
amended.1 45 Such an amendment was included in the Constitutional Treaty and later incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon, but
it is limited in scope. The test of individual concern must still be
satisfied by a private applicant challenging an act which is not
addressed to him or her, unless it is "a regulatory act which is of
direct concern to him or her and does not entail implementing
measures."'146 The position of legislative acts is unchanged. The
Member States seemed to have wished to do no more than was
absolutely necessary to address certain problems that had arisen
in the recent case law, though the position is slightly nuanced
because of the ECJ's consistent failure to interpret the relevant
47
provision of the EC Treaty (Article 230) in an expansive way.'
Alongside these restrictions on access to the Court, both directly and through the national courts, the Member States have
also retained control over the Court's procedures. The International Court of Justice and the ECtHR each have the right to
draw up their own rules of procedure, 14 but the same latitude
has never been extended to the ECJ. Before the entry into force
of the Treaty of Nice, the Court had to wait for the unanimous
approval of the Council before introducing changes to its Rules
of Procedure. This sometimes caused considerable delay. To
enable it to act more rapidly, the Court suggested to the preNice IGC that it should have the right to amend its Rules of Procedure without seeking the approval of the Council. That suggestion failed to attract the support of all the Member States,
although they did agree to permit the Council to grant its approval by qualified majority.1 49 The maintenance of the requirement of Council approval reflected a certain wariness on the
The latter decision was reversed on appeal. See Commission v.Jtgo-Qudrt, Case C-263/
02 P, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 12.
144. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Uni6n dePequefiosAgricultores,[2002]
E.C.R. 1-6677.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See ARNULL, supra note 14, at 69-94.
148. See ECHR, supra note 2, art. 26(d); Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 30.
149. See EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 223, last paragraph, O.J. C 321/37, at E/142.
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part of the Member States at the idea of giving the Court a free
hand to organize its own work.15° It means that the Court has to
explain and justify any proposed changes to the Member States
before they can be introduced. The effect of the dialogue the
Court must enter into with the Member States when it wishes to
amend its Rules of Procedure may be illustrated by the changes
it proposed in 2007, to provide for the introduction of an urgent
preliminary rulings procedure in the context of the AFSJ. 15'1
The Member States insisted on a procedure which would allow
them all to participate fully in the proceedings before the Court,
even though it had also proposed an alternative procedure
which would have been quicker.
Some important rules on the functioning of the Court are
contained, not in its Rules of Procedure, but in the Statute of the
Court. Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, some of
the provisions of the Statute' 5 2 could be amended by the Council, acting unanimously at the request of the Court and after consulting the Commission and the European Parliament.' 53 Since
the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice,154 the Council has had
1 55
the power to amend nearly all the provisions of the Statute.
The Council acts unanimously (a) at the request of the Court of
Justice and after consulting the European Parliament and the
Commission, or (b) at the request of the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.
Before the Treaty of Nice, the Commission had no power to request that changes should be made to the Statute. The loss by
the Court of its exclusive right of initiative means that it no
longer has the power to block such changes.
C. Delegitimization and Non-Compliance

The ECJ has sometimes been the target of attacks by politi150. Cf Arjen W.H. Meij, Guest Editorial: Architects orJudges?Some Comments in Relation to the Current Debate, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1039, 1042 (2000).
151. See Council Decision No. 2008/79/EC, Euratom, 0.J. L 24/42 (2008)
(amending the Statute of the Court ofJustice); Rules of Procedure, 0.J. L 24/39 (2008)
(amending the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice).
152. See EEC Treaty, supra note 23, Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice,
Title III, at 283.
153. See id. art. 188.
154. EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 245, 0.J. C 321 E/37, at 150.
155. See id. (all except the provisions contained in Title I "Judges and AdvocatesGeneral").
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cians seeking to undermine its legitimacy as a court of law. A
famous example is the speech in the House of Lords by Baroness
Thatcher during a debate on the ratification by the United Kingdom of the Maastricht Treaty. She observed that "some things at
the Court are very much to our distaste." 156 She went on:
It has by its decisions greatly extended the powers of the centralised institutions against the nation state. Its methods of
interpreting the law are totally different from those of our
courts and nothing like so exact or so good. The court draws
upon the objective of European integration to inform all its
rulings by which over a period of time it has therefore furthered decisions towards a unitary European state ....

It is

busy reinterpreting so many things to give itself and the Community more powers at our expense. That court does not
have constitutional checks and balances to temper its power.
What was tolerable in1 5 a7 few cases is not bearable on the scale
it is happening now.

A similar attack was launched by the then Austrian Chancellor, Wolfgang Schfissel, on the eve of his country's presidency of
the Union in January 2006. In a newspaper interview, he criticized the ECJ for systematically expanding the Union's jurisdiction."' His attack seemed to have been inspired mainly by a
decision of the Court that restrictions applied to students from
other Member States who wished to study at Austrian universities
159
were unlawful.
Attacks of this type may have a number of purposes, such as
to persuade the Member States that something should be done
to rein the Court in; to act as a warning to the Court; or to reduce the political price of non-compliance with its rulings. I suggested above that isolated shots across the Court's bows are unlikely to have much impact. Attempts by the Member States to
confine the Court within its strategic space have already been
considered. It is therefore to the issue of non-compliance that I
now turn.
The authors of the EC Treaty envisaged that compliance by
156. Margaret Thatcher, House of Lords (June 7, 1993), available at http://www.
margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocumen t.asp?docid=108314.

157. Id.
158. See Mark Beunderman, Fresh EU Presidency Attacks European Court of Justice,
EUOBERVER, Jan. 3, 2006.

159. See Commission v. Austria, Case 147/03, [2005] E.C.R. 5969.
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the Member States with their obligations would be policed by
the Commission and they established a novel mechanism to enable it to do so. This involved an application by the Commission
to the Court, which could declare the defaulting State to be in
breach of the Treaty. 60 A weakness of that mechanism was that
it did not originally provide for the imposition of sanctions on
the defendant. The consequences of that weakness were initially
concealed, at least in part, by the doctrines of direct effect and
primacy, which had the effect of enlisting the support of the national courts in enforcing Community law. In the 1980s, however, there was a rise in the number of cases in which rulings by
the Court against delinquent Member States were not complied
with in the absence of further action by the Commission. This
led to the introduction at Maastricht of a new provision (Article
228(2) EC) enabling the Court to impose potentially substantial
financial sanctions on Member States. 16 '
The procedure was a heavy one, involving a second application to the Court after it had become apparent that a State was
not complying with a judgment finding it in breach of the
Treaty. Nonetheless, the Commission's Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law show that the sanctions procedure is starting to play a useful role in encouraging
Member States to comply with their Treaty obligations. 16 2 Most
sanctions applications by the Commission are settled before the
Court gives judgment, so the number of cases in which sanctions
are actually imposed is small. 163 The Treaty of Lisbon, like the
Constitutional Treaty, reforms the sanctions procedure by enabling the Commission to seek the imposition of a financial penalty in its initial application to the Court, but only in cases concerning the incorrect implementation of a directive.
We may conclude that, while non-compliance by Member
States with rulings of the ECJ has been a problem in the past,
there are now relatively few instances of such behavior. The sin160. See EC Treaty, supra note 29, art. 226, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/144.
161. See id. art. 228(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/145.
162. Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law, 56 MOD. L. REv.
19, 19-54 (1993).
163. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case 304/02, [2005] E.C.RI 1-6263; Commission v. Spain, Case 278/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-14141; Commission v. Hellenic Republic,
Case 387/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5047; cf. Commission v. Germany, Case 503/04, [20071
C.M.L.R. 40.
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gling out in the Treaty of Lisbon, however, of actions involving
the implementation of directives betrays a certain wariness on
the part of the Member States of the manner in which the Court
might employ the sanctions procedure.
D. Exit
Steinberg observes: "In the contemporary [World Trade
Organization] context, the threat of unilateral exit has limited
credibility because it would be costly."1'6 4 The same is undoubtedly true of the European Union. No Member State has left
165
what is now the Union since it was founded over 50 years ago.
At present, the Treaties do not provide for the withdrawal of a
Member State, though there seems little doubt that a State
which was politically determined enough could withdraw if it so
wished. The formal position would in any event change with the
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon which, like the Constitutional Treaty,166 lays down a procedure to be followed where a
Member State decides to withdraw. 167 In the last resort, it would
not be possible to force the departing State to comply with that
procedure. That State, however, would in all likelihood wish to
retain the best possible relations with the remaining Member
States after its departure and one day might even wish to rejoin
the Union. There might, therefore, be strong political reasons
for it to comply with the procedure laid down in the Treaty.
Whether the mere existence of the procedure, with its implicit
recognition that Union membership is not permanent, encourages disgruntled Member States to invoke it remains to be seen.
By offering a way out, it might conceivably make the more enthusiastic Member States less tolerant of laggards.
E. Discursive Constraints
Helfer and Slaughter refer to a "suite of structural controls
and informal signaling devices by which states convey to a tribunal when it is approaching the politically palatable limits of its
164. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 267.
165. Although Greenland, a province of Denmark, withdrew in 1985 following the
introduction of home rule in 1979. See Friedl Weiss, Greenland's Withdrawalfrom the European Communities, 10 EUR. L. REv. 173 (1985).
166. See Constitutional Treaty, supra note 107, art. 1-60, O.J. C 310/1, at 40.

167. See TEU, supra note 53, art. 49(a), O.J. C 321 E/l, at E/27, as amended.
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authority."' 6 8 "A web of relationships built upon the forms and
function of law," they say, "validates certain forms of legal analy169
sis and strategic decision making while discouraging others."
Judges who "venture beyond these discursive parameters risk significant damage to their standing in the eyes of other actors in
170
the community."
The importance of the role played by the national courts of
the Member States in giving effect to Community law has made
the Court's relationship with national judges vital to the proper
functioning of the Community legal order. The success of the
preliminary rulings procedure, once described by the Court as
"the veritable cornerstone of the operation of the internal market,' 1 7 depends for its efficaciousness on the willingness of national courts to make references and apply conscientiously the
rulings they are given. This makes the Court more dependent
on the cooperation of its national counterparts than most other
72
international tribunals.1
The Court has sometimes been willing to adjust its case law
in response to signs of serious dissent from national courts. The
most famous example is the development of its case law on the
general principle of respect for fundamental rights. As is well
known, this represented a response to case law of the German
courts suggesting that, in the absence of any protection for fundamental rights at the Community level, they would test the validity of Community acts against the fundamental rights enshrined in the German Constitution.17 1 Similarly, the hostile re168.
169.
170.
171.

Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 930.
Id. at 953.
Id.
See the Court's Report on the Application of the TEU in The Proceedings of the

Court ofJustice and Court of FirstInstance of the European Communities, Doc. No. T-15/95,

11 (May 22-26, 1995).
172. National courts may sometimes have reasons of their own for cooperating
with the ECJ. See J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 197 (1999); seealso
Karen Alter, ExplainingNational Court Acceptance of European CourtJurisprudence: A Criti-

cal Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL
COURTS-DocTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 241 (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet &
J.H.H. Weiler eds., 1998). But cf Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Matti, Europe Before the
Court: A Political Theoy of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 65 (1993).
173. Among many accounts, see ARNULL, supra note 14, at ch.10. The failure of

the Constitutional Treaty might conceivably prompt a renewal of national judicial restiveness. See Hjalte Rasmussen, Present and FutureEuropeanJudicialProblems after Enlargement and the Post-2005 Ideological Revolt, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1661, 1662 (2007); see

also ARNULL, supra note 14, at 665. Perhaps to reassure national courts, in Advocaten
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ception accorded to the Court's case law on the direct effect of
directives in the courts of France and Germany 174 appears to
have influenced its decision in the famous Marshall case 175 that
directives could not impose obligations on individuals.
F. Summary
The table on the following page summarizes the variety of
agency
ways in which the Member States have sought to reduce
176
slack and confine the Court within its strategic space.
APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION
It has not been my intention in this paper to add to the
debate on whether the Court is an autonomous actor, able to
disregard the interests of Member States, or whether it has depended for its success on the consent of those States.1 77 There is
much to be said for the verdict of Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz
that "[t]he ECJ is manifestly neither master nor servant" of national governments. 171 Indeed, it is rather as if the Member
States have been engaged in an elaborate game of chess with the
Court. When they drew up the Treaties, they handed the Court
the white pieces, which it proceeded to use with great panache
in the 1960s and 1970s to establish a strong position in the
center of the board. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Member States
captured a few of the Court's pieces and developed some of
their own. We now seem to have entered the middle-game, in
voor de Wereld, the Court reviewed the validity of a third-pillar framework decision for
compatibility with general principles of law said to be "reaffirmed" in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Case C-303/05 (May 3, 2007) (not yet reported).
174. See Jens P6tner, Report on France, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL

COURTS, supra note 172, at 48-50 (referring to the decision of the French Conseil
d'Etat of December 22, 1978 in Minister of the Interior v. Cohn-Bendit, I C.M.L.R. 543
(1980)); see also Juliane Kokott, Report on Germany, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NA_
TIONAL COURTS, supra note 172, at 116; see also Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct
Effect'":
An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REv. 155, 169-70 (1983).
175. See Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth.,

Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723.
176. The letters in parentheses after certain entries in the second column denote
the treaty in which the relevant step was taken, using the following abbreviations: SEA:
Single European Act; TEU: Treaty on European Union; ToA: Treaty of Amsterdam;
ToN: Treaty of Nice; CT: Constitutional Treaty; ToL: Treaty of Lisbon.
177. See Alter, supra note 13, at 121-22; see also Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra
note 11, at 149-50.
178. Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 11, at 175; see also Andersen & Glencross, supra note 81.
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Examples
" Declaration on internal market
deadline (SEA)
* Protocol on abortion (TEU)
* Protocol on property in Denmark
(TEU)
• "Barbe' protocol (TEU)
* Affirmative action amendment to
Article 141 (ex 119) EC (ToA)
* Protocol on position of UK and
Ireland (ToA)
* Protocol on position of Denmark
(ToA)
* Revised Charter of Fundamental
Rights (CT/ToL)
* Protocol on the application of the
Charter to Poland and the UK
(ToL)
* Article 46 (ex L) TEU
* Jurisdiction over AFSJ (Articles 68

*
0

*

C. Delegitimization
and Non-Compliance
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0
*
*

EC and 35 TEU) (ToA)
Protocol on Transitional Provisions
(ToL)
Reform of standing rules in
annulment actions brought by
private applicants (CT/ToL)
Procedure for changing Rules of
Procedure/Statute of the Court
(ToN)
Public expressions of political
disapproval
Failure to comply with judgments
Sanctions procedure (TEU/CT/
ToL)

D. Exit

o Withdrawal procedure (CT/ToL)

E. Discursive
Constraints

0

Relations with national courts

which each player's moves are based on a calculation of the tactical possibilities in the position. Since neither player is likely to
resign or achieve checkmate, the risk is that the game will end in
stalemate.
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This state of affairs hardly seems conducive to the healthy
development of the Union. The effectiveness of the judicial arrangements for the AFSJ created at Amsterdam is in inverse proportion to their Heath Robinson complexity. Yet they are the
product of concern on the part of some Member States at least
as to the consequences if new substantive provisions were subjected to the classic powers of the Court. The Court's response
has predictably been to attempt to align the Amsterdam arrangements with those very powers, but in so doing it is likely to have
confirmed the suspicions of those who had wanted to limit its
jurisdiction. In the same way, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights could and should have been a short and accessible catalogue of basic rights, but misgivings about (among other things)
what the Court would make of it have resulted in complex horizontal provisions and lengthy "explanations" which make its effect hard to assess, even for specialists and even if it is assumed to
be binding.
Not only have attempts been made in these areas to curtail
the jurisdiction of the Court, or to influence the way it exercises
its jurisdiction, but some Member States have decided to opt out,
wholly or partly, from the arrangements concerned. The United
Kingdom and Poland were unable to accept the status accorded
to the amended Charter and revised "explanations" by the
Treaty of Lisbon without a special protocol "clarifying" the internal effect and justiciability of the Charter. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark opted out at Amsterdam of the new
Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty, opt outs which will be
preserved in the Treaty of Lisbon. Only fifteen of the Member
States have accepted the preliminary rulings jurisdiction of the
Court under the third pillar. The extension by the Treaty of Lisbon of the classic powers of the Court to what is now the third
pillar may result in the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from
acts it currently accepts and divergence between the versions of
acts applicable in Denmark and those applicable elsewhere in
the Union. It is hard to deny that this ad hoc legal 1 disintegra79
tion is partly attributable to the record of the Court.
179. For examples of differentiation in the legal framework not related to the role
of the Court, see DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DAsHWOOD, EUROPEAN UNION LAw 113-16 (5th
ed. 2006); cf TEU, supra note 53, arts. 27a-27e, 40-40b, 43M5, O.J. C 321 E/l, at 21-22,
29-30, 31-33; EC Treaty, supra note 29, arts. 11, 1la, O.J. C 321 E/l, at E/47-48 (dealing
with so-called enhanced cooperation). These provisions are to be replaced by a new
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If the Court operates in the shadow of the Member States,
the. reverse is also true: the Member States clearly operate in the
shadow of the Court. Not only have they intervened frequently
in response to expansive lawmaking by the Court, but their own
approach to new initiatives has been influenced by assumptions
about the Court's likely reaction. What can be done to break the
circle? The answer to that question must acknowledge the
Court's role as the architect of many of the features that have
made the Union so successful: the establishment, on the basis of
respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, of the largest
single market in the world.18 1 It is for that reason that the Court
is seen as a model by States seeking to replicate the Union in
other parts of the globe. This rules out any institutional change
which would superimpose on the Court a higher body, a sort of
European Conseil Constitutionnel,18 1 to preempt or correct the
Court. The result of such an innovation would be to undermine
the rule of law and weaken the legal protection accorded to individuals.
The solution must instead be sought in the development of
a new modus vivendi between the Court and national governments in which each party seeks to develop greater sensitivity to
the agenda of the other. This would entail involving the Court
in legal and policy developments of direct concern to it. There
have been some small signs of movement in that direction. An
advantage of the current procedures for amending its Statute
and Rules of Procedure is that they require the Council, and
sometimes the Commission and the European Parliament, to
enter into a conversation with the Court which may improve mutual understanding.18 2 During the run-up to the 1996 IGC, the
Court was invited, along with the other institutions, to submit a
Article 10 TEU and new Articles 280a-280i TFEU following the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 112, art. 10, O.J. C 306/01, at 22; id.
art. 280A-2801, at 127-130.
180. For a recent analysis, see generally HER MAJEsrY's TREASURY, DEPr. OF TRADE
AND INDUS., THE SINGLE MARKET: A VISION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2007), available at

http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file37083.pdf.
181. Cf 1958 CONST. arts. 56-63 (Fr.); JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1992).
182. In 2006 during the discussions over the introduction of an urgent preliminary
rulings procedure in the context of the Area of Freedom, Security andJustice, the President of the Court, Judge Skouris, appeared in person before both the Permanent Representatives Committee and the national Ministers for Justice. See Council of the European Union, Supplement to the Discussion Paper on the Treatment of Questions Re-
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report to a Study Group set up by the European Council on the
operation of the Maastricht Treaty. In 1999 before the pre-Nice
IGC, the Court forced onto the agenda the question of reforming the Community's judicial architecture by issuing a discussion paper on the subject."' 3 At Tampere later the same year,
the European Council decided that the body (later called a Convention) charged with drawing up the Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights should include two representatives of the Court
as observers.' 8 4
Since then, there seems to have been something of a retreat. The Court had no observers of the Convention on the
Future of Europe, which drew up the draft Constitutional
Treaty, the Praesidium of that Convention merely having the
right to invite the President of the Court to address the Convention.181 In the event, several members of the Court contributed
to the deliberations of the Convention's Working Groups. 186 It
was only belatedly, however, that the Convention set up its socalled Discussion Circle on the Court to consider the implications for it of some of the proposals being considered.18 7 The
ordinary Treaty revision procedure set out in the Treaty of Lisbon 8 8 provides for a Convention to be convened. Although the
European Central Bank will have to be "consulted in the case of
institutional changes in the monetary area," the Court will have
ferred for a Preliminary Ruling Concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
17013/06 (Dec. 22, 2006).
183. See The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union, Proposals and Reflections, sent to the Council on May 10, 1999. The text is reproduced in THE FUTURE OF
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 111-43 (Alan Dashwood & Angus Johnston eds., 2001).
184. See Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Oct. 15-16, 1999),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:
306:0042:0133:EN:PDF.
185. See Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Laeken, at 25, SN
300/1/01 REV 1 (Dec. 14-15, 2001).
186. For example, A.G. Jacobs (Working Group I: Subsidiarity); Judge Skouris
(Working Group II: Charter/ECHR); A.G. Tizzano (Working Group III: Legal Personality).
187. In the course of its work, the Discussion Circle heard both the President of
the Court of Justice, Judge Rodriguez Iglesias, and the President of the Court of First
Instance, Judge Vesterdorf. See Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of
Justice, CONV 636/03 (Mar. 25, 2003).
188. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 112, art. 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 38 (amending
art. 48(1) TEU).
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no formal involvement in the process.18 9 The Court was not consulted on the final text of the draft Constitutional Treaty, much
of which was reflected in the Constitutional Treaty and the
Treaty of Lisbon, even though (to paraphrase) it envisaged important "institutional changes in the judicial area."'1 90 It will be
important in the future for the Court to be involved informally
in discussions on changes to provisions in the Treaties and elsewhere which are of direct concern to it if a climate of mutual
understanding is to be nurtured.
What contribution can the Court itself make to this process?
Many of the decisions discussed above were amply justified both
on their own terms and in the broader context of the Community's then state of development. But some of the more recent
case law' suggests that the Court has failed to adapt to a changing landscape in which Member States are seeking different ways
of collaborating in new policy areas. In Van Gend en Loos, the
Court said that, in order to establish whether treaty provisions
had direct effect, it was necessary "to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those provisions."' 9 2 The Court
must learn to accept that it is not only the wording of the Treaties that has changed since 1963.

189. The new Article 48(2) and 48(3) TEU provide for two simplified Treaty revision procedures, but these are less likely than the ordinary revision procedure to affect
the Court directly. Id. art. 1, O.J. C 306/1, at 38-39 (amending art. 48 TEU).
190. It is unclear whether the Court was consulted on the agreement reached with
Poland towards the end of the 2007 IGC that it should have a permanent Advocate
General alongside Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom and cease to
take part in the rotation system applicable to the remaining Member States. See id.,
Declaration on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
regarding the number of Advocates-General in the Court of Justice, O.J. C 306/1, at
262. That declaration requires the Court to make a request under Article 222 in order
to take effect.
191. See, e.g., Gestoras Pro-Amnistia v. Council, Case C-354/04 P, [2007] 2
C.M.L.R. 22; Pupino, Case C-105/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5285; Commission v. Council,
Case C-176/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7879.
192. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62,
[1963] E.C.R. 1, at 12.

